Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct effect especially in the absence of other factors, such as personal contact. So we aimed to determine how robust the means/byproduct effect is by conducting a meta-analysis of both published and unpublished studies (k = 101; 24,058 participants). We found that while there is an overall small difference between moral judgments of means and byproducts (standardized mean difference = 0.87, 95% CI 0.67-1.06; standardized mean change = 0.57, 95% CI 0.44-0.69; log odds ratio = 1.59, 95% CI 1.15-2.02), the mean effect size is primarily moderated by whether the outcome is brought about by personal contact, which typically involves the use of personal force.
Introduction
Many people find it morally questionable for physicians to kill their terminally ill patients as a means to ending suffering, even when patients competently request it. That's active euthanasia, which is illegal in many countries. Yet in the same jurisdictions it is typically legal for physicians to commence palliative care that merely has the known side effect of hastening a terminal patient's death. The distinction between harming as a means and harming as a byproduct can also be observed when the stakes are much lower. Some experimental studies suggest that people regard destroying one piece of property as a means to saving five other pieces of property as morally worse than sacrificing one as a mere side effect (or byproduct) of saving the greater goods (e.g. Millar et al., 2014) . Suppose, for example, that you can save someone's five rare books by diverting some spilled bleach that's fast approaching them. It may seem morally acceptable to save these books, even if you know that as a side effect the caustic liquid will then flow toward just one rare book and destroy it. But it strikes many as less morally appropriate to save the five if doing so involves using someone else's beloved book as a means to diverting the bleach.
The distinction fits with a venerable theory in moral philosophy that is associated with the Doctrine of Double Effect. The Doctrine is complicated and variously formulated. John Mikhail (2011: 149), for example, articulates it as follows:
[A]n otherwise prohibited action, such as battery or homicide, which has both good and bad effects may be permissible if the prohibited act itself is not directly intended, the good but not the bad effects are directly intended, the good effects outweigh the bad effects, and no morally preferable alternative is available.
A core element of any formulation of the Doctrine is something like the means/byproduct distinction, embodied in what we can dub the Means Principle: all else being equal, bringing about a bad outcome as a means to a noble goal is morally worse, or more difficult to justify, than bringing about the same outcome as a side effect (McIntyre, 2001; Mikhail, 2011; Wedgwood, 2011) .
2 Some, especially those in the Catholic tradition, have used the Doctrine to reconcile the ideas that a human fetus is a person, it's always wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person, but it's sometimes permissi- 
